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The Nuclear Agreement with Iran:  
Successful Settling of an 
International Crisis
Henner Fürtig
On 14 July 2015, after intense and controversial negotiations, delegates of the perma-
nent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the European Union, 
and Germany, on the one side, and Iran, on the other, signed the Joint Comprehensive 
Plan of Action (JCPOA) in Vienna – thereby settling a 12-year-long international crisis.
Analysis
The JCPOA signatures represent multiple victories: a triumph of international diploma-
cy in a region, which mostly attracts attention through violent conflicts; a triumph for 
the United Nations and the UNSC, who have rarely reached consensus; a victory for the 
European Union and Germany, who demonstrated their ability to participate in global 
conflict resolution; and a victory for the United States and its president, who was able 
to resolve a long-lasting crisis in the Middle East without using military force. It was al-
so a victory for Iran, which can now hope to end its international isolation and prosper. 
With all due respect, however, these are no grounds for euphoria.
  The agreement will only enter into force after being ratified by the signatory states; 
in the US Congress, in particular, tough opposition is looming.
  While the JCPOA may have improved conditions for resolving other conflicts in the 
Middle East, it is no panacea. Given the complex nature of upheavals in the region, 
to suggest otherwise would be akin to Francis Fukuyama’s premature claim that the 
end of the Cold War represented the “end of history.”
  Israel and the Gulf States are highly sceptical of the treaty. For Israel, it signals in-
ternational legitimation of Iran’s nuclear programme; for the heads of state on the 
Arabian Peninsula, it implies a preference for Iran in the contest for regional dom-
inance.
  More moderate and reform-minded forces may actually be strengthened in Iran. 
However, the state and regime are unlikely to undergo a radical change of charac-
ter. The system that emerged from the revolution has repeatedly demonstrated its 
ability to adapt and assimilate.
Keywords: Iran, nuclear treaty, UN, EU, USA, Israel
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Highlights of an International Conflict
Since joining the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation 
of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1968, Iran has insist-
ed on the inherent right to use atomic energy for 
strictly peaceful purposes. However, in June 2003 
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
for the first time expressed serious doubts re-
garding the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear pro-
gramme. In order to dispel misgivings, the then 
Iranian reformist president, Mohammad Khata-
mi, agreed to the demands of the so-called EU–
3 (Germany, the United Kingdom, and France) to 
renounce uranium enrichment. At the same time, 
Iran signed the NPT’s binding Additional Proto-
col of 1970, which, among other things, facilitates 
international controls. As a goodwill gesture, Iran 
signalled the US government its willingness to 
limit the number of centrifuges used to enrich ura-
nium to the 3,000 it already operated at that time 
(Mathews 2015: 3).
Nevertheless, Washington did not respond posi-
tively to the Iranian offer, since doing so would have 
implied US acceptance of the status quo. Instead, 
the United States demanded that Tehran immedi-
ately disclose its entire nuclear programme and per-
mit inspections by the IAEA; refusal to do so would 
result in the United States intensifying the unilater-
al regime of sanctions it imposed on Iran after the Is-
lamic Revolution of 1979 and which it had already 
expanded on many occasions. At that time, how-
ever, a comprehensive nuclear treaty between the 
United States and India was made public, which led 
Tehran to believe that the US government was seek-
ing to prohibit Iran from using any nuclear energy. 
When Mahmoud Ahmadinejad replaced Moham-
mad Khatami as president of Iran in August 2005, 
Iran’s scepticism hardened, and the EU-3’s negoti-
ating efforts failed. The five permanent members of 
the UNSC and Germany – the “P5+1” – then took 
over the task of pursuing a nuclear deal with Iran. 
Iran’s controversial nuclear programme had be-
come a global conflict.
The P5+1’s concerted efforts resulted in three 
UNSC resolutions which demanded that Iran ful-
ly disclose its nuclear programme and threatened 
a coordinated system of sanctions should it refuse 
(Resolution 1737 in December 2006, Resolution 
1747 in March 2007, and Resolution 1803 in March 
2008). Despite the resolutions, Tehran continued 
to develop its nuclear programme and, in partic-
ular, to install more centrifuges – this resulted in 
the sanctions coming into effect.
In September 2009 Western intelligence services 
alleged that near the city of Qom “irrefutable evi-
dence” had been found of a secret site (Fordow) that 
was capable of producing highly enriched uranium. 
The Iranian leadership played down the issue, de-
scribing Fordow as a “pilot plant.”
In view of this, the UNSC passed Resolution 
1929 on 9 June 2010, which expressly demanded 
that Iran immediately comply with all earlier res-
olutions. Failure to do so would result in a fourth 
round of sanctions with drastic consequences for 
Iran’s economy (Snow 2010: 25). When Iran did not 
react accordingly, an intensified regime of sanctions 
was imposed, which is still in effect. Two years lat-
er the IAEA still did not give an all-clear signal: On 
the contrary, in November 2011 the agency reported 
that it could not certify that all Iran’s nuclear mate-
rial was for peaceful use only. With regard to a pos-
sible military dimension, the report stated that “Iran 
has carried out activities relevant to the develop-
ment of a nuclear explosive device […] under a 
structured programme and that some activities 
may still be ongoing” (IAEA 2011: 10). 
No further progress was made in resolving the 
conflict until 2013, when the June election of the 
moderate politician and cleric Hassan Rouhani as 
president of Iran reopened the possibility of a res-
olution through dialogue. In November that year, 
Iran’s negotiators in Geneva agreed with the rep-
resentatives of the P5+1 and signed a first Action 
Plan, which outlined the basis of a permanent so-
lution – the first real signal of hope in a decade. 
Negotiations on the permanent solution began on 
21 January 2014. On 2 May 2015, the framework 
for a deal was announced in Lausanne.
The Positions of the Adversaries
P5+1
The United States was the P5+1 group’s driving 
force from the start. Therefore, any binding so-
lution to the conflict required support from the 
United States – the world’s strongest military and 
economic power – which had been in almost per-
manent strife with Iran since the 1979 Islamic Rev-
olution. After soberly studying the conflict, the 
Obama administration concluded that even the 
strongest sanctions would not cause the capitula-
tion of a regime that was bent on developing its 
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nuclear capacity. In 2003 Iran had 3,000 centrifug-
es; 10 years later, when the first Action Plan was 
agreed upon in Geneva, the number had risen to 
19,000 despite the conservatively estimated USD 
100 billion that sanctions had cost Iran (Mathews 
2015: 3). Thus, the lack of a negotiated settlement 
would have only left two options: to accept the 
Iranian nuclear programme in its present form, 
which would have been politically unacceptable, 
or to militarily destroy Iran’s nuclear facilities. 
President Obama repeatedly explained that he 
neither believed that sanctions would cause Iran 
to abandon its nuclear programme nor considered 
even perfectly executed military strikes capable 
of setting back Iran’s programme by more than 
a year or two. The latter action would also have 
the undesired consequence of causing the Irani-
an people to unite behind their government and 
convincing them that Iran needed to develop its 
nuclear capability in order to deter foreign inter-
vention. In May 2015 Obama made it clear that he 
considered the agreement with Iran on the nucle-
ar issue to be one of his presidency’s greatest suc-
cesses (Sa’ar and Shalom 2015: 1-3).
Because President Obama sees resolving the nu-
clear conflict with Iran as shaping his legacy, he is 
keen on reaching a durable solution, both in the eyes 
of the world and his political opponents at home. 
However, the numerous “security hooks” that he or-
dered his negotiators in Geneva and Lausanne to in-
clude into the prospective agreement annoyed the 
Iranian delegation. In particular, Washington insist-
ed on including a mechanism to immediately reim-
pose sanctions should Iran violate the terms of the 
agreement – which Tehran vehemently rejected. 
On that point Iran sought support from the perma-
nent UNSC members Russia and China. It was well 
known that there had been numerous differences of 
opinion between these two countries and the other 
P5+1 members in the past.
Above all, Russia and China pursue their own 
strategic interests when dealing with Iran. The Chi-
nese president, Xi Jinping, declared that Iran was a 
“strategic partner” in December 2014 and empha-
sised how much he values the cooperation with 
“the world’s most important developing countries, 
Brazil, South Africa, Mexico and Iran” (Shahandeh 
2015: 1). For the United States and its transatlantic 
allies in the P5+1, it was important to keep the group 
of negotiators united and to constantly involve Rus-
sia and China so as to avoid giving the impression 
that the nuclear talks were a confrontation between 
Iran and “the West” (Meier and Pieper 2015: 1). The 
P5+1’s decade-long cohesion testifies to how uneasy 
governments around the world feel with regard to 
Iran’s nuclear programme.
Iran
Since the beginning of the crisis, the Iranian lead-
ership and especially the Supreme Leader Aya-
tollah Ali Khamenei have been convinced that 
the P5+1 and the United States in particular have 
been less concerned with containing Iran’s nu-
clear capabilities than they have been with con-
trolling and undermining the Islamic Republic of 
Iran (IRI) as such. This view was a tenet for ma-
ny years, and Iranian leaders accepted the heavy 
costs associated with their adamancy. After 2011, 
however, costs exploded under the fourth round 
of sanctions.
According to Iranian sources, the country’s 
gross domestic product (GDP) fell by 5.8 per cent 
in 2012 and by 2 per cent in 2013.1 By the time Rou-
hani became president in August 2013, Iran’s daily 
oil exports had dropped to one million barrels be-
cause the European Union had stopped importing 
oil from Iran in July 2012, and because Asian buy-
ers had also considerably reduced their imports. 
That resulted in a drop of 54 per cent in 2011, the 
year before the fourth round of sanctions took ef-
fect (Snow 2015: 15). Because the sanctions large-
ly exclude Iran from international banking trans-
actions, the country was even unable to effectively 
use its much lower foreign exchange revenue. The 
resulting shortages of raw materials and spare 
parts led to a very low level of industrial utilisa-
tion, which in turn reduced the demand for work-
force, causing high unemployment.
Experts agree that the current economic crisis is 
as grave as the one between 1988 and 1990, when the 
massive damage and destruction of the eight-year 
war with Iraq forced Khamenei’s predecessor, the 
IRI’s founder, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, to al-
ter his vision of “exporting” the Islamic Revolution 
and to charge President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsan-
jani with ensuring the survival of the acutely threat-
ened IRI. Khamenei has done the same thing: imme-
diately after Rouhani’s inauguration, the Supreme 
Leader spoke of a new period of “heroic flexibili-
ty” in foreign policy (Gerami 2014: vii). This meant 
granting the president considerable leeway in his ef-
forts to respond to international sanctions through 
1 Details Iran Economics Magazine, 3/2014: 4.
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accommodation and a willingness to compromise in 
order to ease and ultimately be relieved of them. He 
even allowed direct talks with the United States, the 
“Great Satan” in the revolutionary propaganda.
Clearly, Rouhani’s top priority was to preserve 
the IRI. His loyalty was tested. As secretary of the 
Supreme National Security Council between 1989 
and 2005, he had acted as Iran’s chief negotiator 
in the then nuclear talks with the West. In this ca-
pacity he had shown no doubts about his convic-
tion that Iran – like all NPT signatory states – has 
the right to peacefully use atomic energy. As long 
as this right is accepted, compromises with the 
P5+1 are just a necessary evil to keep the IRI ec-
onomically viable (Monshipouri and Dorraj 2013: 
137). A successful nuclear deal will also strength-
en Rouhani in domestic-policy disputes with his 
conservative opponents. Since the Geneva Action 
Plan of 2013, the latter have used every opportu-
nity to claim that the P5+1’s requests for changes 
and additional demands prove that the West and 
the United States have no real interest in reaching 
an amicable solution with Iran. They particularly 
lambasted the P5+1’s wish to inspect Iran’s missile 
programme and Revolutionary Guards institu-
tions as well as the announcement that sanctions 
would only be eased gradually. They praised Su-
preme Leader Khamenei as the only guarantor of 
Iran’s refusal to succumb to Western enticements. 
Yet Khamenei obviously decided that Iran’s rigid 
stance was too costly.
The Compromise
The P5+1 was primarily concerned about guaran-
tees that Iran would not develop a military nucle-
ar programme, whereas Iran mainly sought guar-
antees of their right to peacefully use atomic en-
ergy and enrich low levels of uranium, as well as 
immediate relief from sanctions. Therefore, the 
JCPOA had to be a compromise.
The JCPOA’s most important points concern 
the number and production of centrifuges used 
to enrich uranium. Their total number will be re-
duced from 19,000 to 6,000 over the next 10 years, 
and only older, less powerful centrifuges will be 
allowed. Uranium will be enriched to just 3.67 per 
cent (an atomic bomb requires a 90 per cent en-
richment level), and stocks of uranium that have 
already been enriched to more than 3.67 per cent 
will be drastically reduced from nearly 12,000 kg 
to just 300 kg over 15 years, with the surplus to be 
sold at the usual international terms.
The Arak heavy-water nuclear facility will be 
converted into a research reactor incapable of pro-
ducing plutonium for nuclear weapons. The For-
dow enrichment facility, long kept secret, will be-
come a nuclear research centre, and uranium will 
only be enriched in Natanz. The UN ban on im-
porting and exporting armaments will be extend-
ed to five years; importing technology that could 
be used for Iran’s ballistic missile programme will 
be banned for eight years. In addition, the IAEA 
will have broad access to all of Iran’s nuclear facil-
ities, including the entire infrastructure needed to 
supply a power plant. Furthermore, Tehran must 
also open its military sites in the event of well-
founded suspicion. Any disputes will be settled 
by a commission.
Current economic sanctions will only be gradu-
ally lifted once the IAEA has confirmed that Iran has 
complied with its obligations to cut back its nucle-
ar programme. A “snapback” provision is in place 
to allow the international community to quickly re-
activate sanctions should Iran violate the conditions 
of the JCPOA.2
Only Winners?
The five permanent members of the UNSC and 
Germany have shown their ability to resolve a 
controversy that had lasted more than 10 years. 
President Obama has crowned his second term in 
office with an extraordinary foreign policy suc-
cess. In the medium term, Iran will finally be able 
to shed the economic straitjacket that has obstruct-
ed domestic stability and limited the effect of its 
foreign policy. Has the agreement thus only pro-
duced winners? Closer observation will show.
Iran
Iran’s economy is suffering from such a deep 
structural crisis that sanction relief (which will not 
begin much before 2016, and even then will only 
be gradual) will have no immediate, and certain-
ly no fundamentally positive, effect. Despite this, 
there was already a perceptible sense of optimism 
in Iran in 2015 largely due to expectations of flour-
ishing foreign trade. Just the prospect of having 
2 Cf. <www.tagesschau.de/ausland/iran-atomabkommen-101.
html> (17 July 2015).
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USD 100 billion in frozen foreign assets released 
creates a dynamic effect (Clawson and Khalaji 
2014: 2). The political forces associated with a pos-
itive outcome to the negotiations stand to benefit 
the most – namely, the moderate and reform-ori-
ented politicians represented by President Rou-
hani. At the beginning of his presidential term, 
Rouhani named three main goals: (1) overcoming 
Iran’s international political isolation, which pri-
marily required resolving the nuclear issue, (2) re-
ducing the state’s domination of the economy and 
creating a favourable investment climate for do-
mestic and foreign businesses, and (3) increasing 
society’s political participation (Bakhash 2014: 3). 
Just two years after taking office, it is clear that 
he will be only able to reach these goals one after 
the other – which is evidenced by the absence of 
any major political reforms to date. Resolving the 
nuclear conflict with the West and thereby ending 
Iran’s international isolation and ensuring sanc-
tions relief took priority for Rouhani – a move 
that was backed by Supreme Leader Khamenei. 
The political capital gained both domestically and 
internationally by Rouhani will help him to pur-
sue his reform programme despite the opposition. 
Nonetheless, the latter’s resistance is growing.
The earlier efforts of Rouhani’s reform-minded 
predecessors, such as Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsan-
jani and Mohammad Khatami, were derailed by 
the Principalists – the other main politically con-
servative camp in post–revolutionary Iran, which 
is primarily composed of the 1979 revolutionar-
ies and Iran–Iraq War veterans. Not only do the 
Principalists see their interpretation of the Islam-
ic Revolution and its results at stake, they believe 
their substantial economic interests are also under 
threat. The shadow economy that has flourished 
under sanctions earns them huge profits; cautious 
estimates put the annual profits of the Revolution-
ary Guards alone at around USD 12 billion (Sad-
jadpour and Taleblu 2015: 3). Thus far, the conser-
vative Principalists have always managed to con-
vince the supreme leader that they, not the presi-
dent, were his most faithful followers.
Once again, it is Ali Khamenei who will tip the 
scale. The supreme leader deeply mistrusts the 
West, especially the United States. He even con-
sidered the nuclear talks to be aggressive attempts 
by the United States and its allies, including Isra-
el, to deprive Iran of its legitimate rights and bring 
the revolutionary regime to its knees. In July 2014 
Khamenei asserted that “Reconciliation between 
Iran and America is possible, but not possible be-
tween the Islamic Republic and America” (Sadjad-
pour and Taleblu 2015: 3). That does not mean, how-
ever, that Iran is incapable of pragmatic foreign and 
domestic policy. The survival of the Islamic Repub-
lic and its regime has top priority. Khamenei’s sup-
port for Rouhani came from his conviction that only 
a clean break could put an end to the West’s “stran-
gulation.” In addition, following the severe cri-
sis of legitimacy after the 2009 elections, he consid-
ered it an opportune time to give the winner, Rou-
hani, some leeway and to benefit from his popular-
ity. Khamenei’s approval of a nuclear compromise 
was primarily about survival rather than any desire 
for a new orientation in domestic or foreign policy.
United States and the West
For the United States, signing the nuclear agree-
ment with Iran represents a milestone and could 
be a turning point in the two countries’ mutual-
ly antagonistic relationship. The 1979 Islamic Rev-
olution inflicted a defeat of strategic proportions 
on the United States. Moreover, the holding hos-
tage of 52 US citizens for 444 days was deeply hu-
miliating for Washington. Years after the Islam-
ic Revolution, US administrations continued to 
openly call for regime change in Tehran. Ayatol-
lah Khamenei and his supporters are sure that, in 
this regard, nothing has changed.
The recent agreement clearly raises the threshold 
for the United States to launch a military attack. Such 
a step can now only be taken in response to Iran’s 
clear non-compliance with the terms of the agree-
ment; vague indications that the Iranian nuclear 
programme has a military application no longer suf-
fice. Given his predecessor’s experience in Afghani-
stan and Iraq, as well as the unpredictable develop-
ments in the Middle East, President Obama had to 
retain the threat of force as a last resort – though it 
is something he definitely wants to avoid. The US 
administration hopes that moderate and reformist 
forces in Iran will benefit the most from the agree-
ment, and that the overwhelming majority of Irani-
ans hope for economic recovery and crave an end to 
their international isolation. A prosperous and sta-
ble Iran would most likely seek to play a more con-
structive – or at least a more predictable – role in 
the current and foreseeable upheavals in the Mid-
dle East. The nuclear deal could mark the end of the 
“revolution” and the beginning of the “state.”
However, this judgement might be premature. 
The IRI has a dual structure that consists of a “pil-
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lar” and a “supporting leg.” The “pillar” is represent-
ed by the “Islamic” or “revolutionary” side, which 
has the Supreme Leader at the top and is braced by 
a network of hundreds of thousands of mosques, ec-
onomically powerful religious foundations, and the 
mighty Revolutionary Guards. The “supporting leg” 
is represented by the “republican” or “state” side 
and consists of the president and his administra-
tion and all the state institutions, including the reg-
ular army; it is, according to the Constitution, subor-
dinate and open to modification. In his last will and 
testament, IRI founder Ayatollah Khomeini ensured 
that Iran’s national interests would take priority 
over those of the Islamic world community, there-
by allowing his successor Khamenei and future Ira-
nian governments to flexibly pursue foreign policy. 
Therefore, Iran’s greater pragmatism in the wake of 
signing the JCPOA does not imply any change in 
the state’s character.
Iran’s Neighbours
Right after taking office, President Rouhani identi-
fied three foreign policy circles or arenas: (1) Iran’s 
immediate neighbourhood, (2) a conglomeration 
of non-aligned states,3 the BRIC states and Latin 
American allies like Venezuela, Cuba, and Boliv-
ia, and (3) the West (Monshipouri and Dorraj 2013: 
142). This is clearly not a priority list, since reach-
ing a settlement with the West definitely topped 
Rouhani’s foreign policy concerns.
Nevertheless, Iran’s relations with the Gulf States 
were in a sorry state. Therefore, in his first press con-
ference Rouhani stressed the importance of improv-
ing relations with Iran’s “neighbour” and “brother,” 
Saudi Arabia (Monshipouri and Dorraj 2013: 142). 
Ultimately, he was not only referring to Saudi Ara-
bia but to all Gulf monarchies. On the Arabian Pen-
insula, the recent nuclear agreement is viewed very 
critically. Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Saudi 
Arabia and Iran have been fighting for the prerog-
ative to interpret political Islam. Commonly por-
trayed as part of the Sunni–Shia conflict within Is-
lam, the two states are in fact bitterly vying for in-
fluence and dominance in the region’s most explo-
sive hotspots: Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Lebanon. Sau-
di Arabia and its allies see the nuclear agreement as 
awarding Iran enormous opportunities for substan-
tial economic and political advantages in the strug-
gle for regional dominance.
3 In August 2012 Iran was elected chair of the Non-Aligned 
Movement for a three-year term.
On its northern border, Iran is striving to ar-
range benefit-oriented exchanges with the Central 
Asian republics; to the East and West, it is seeking 
to keep the trouble spots in Afghanistan, Iraq, and 
Syria under control. Only with regard to Palestine 
has Iran maintained the same position since 1979: 
it vehemently rejects a two-state solution. Howev-
er, Rouhani has tried to relativise the anti-Semitic at-
tacks of his predecessor, Ahmadinejad. In an inter-
view with CNN’s Christiane Amanpour in Septem-
ber 2013, Rouhani condemned the “Nazi massacre 
of the Jews.”4
Israel
The Israeli government sees such statements as lit-
tle more than tactical manoeuvring that will not 
change the two countries’ strategic antagonism. Ira-
nians never tire of alluding to this antagonism, while 
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu uses every op-
portunity to point out the supposed danger and ag-
gressive nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. His 
mistrust of a state that denies Israel’s right to exist is 
completely understandable. However, international 
experts have repeatedly warned the Israeli govern-
ment not to exaggerate the danger of Iran’s nucle-
ar programme. Even if a military intention were be-
lieved to exist, there is a huge gap between theoreti-
cally mastering the process and actually developing 
an arsenal of usable nuclear weapons (Cordesman 
2015: 6). The military value of a single atomic bomb 
is “zilch” (Mathews 2015: 4), and any evidence of a 
bomb would legitimise a drastic response from the 
international community, including Israel. The US 
administration believes that the JCPOA has eliminat-
ed this development for the long run and deserves 
Israel’s support because of it. Netanyahu, however, 
disagrees. According to him, for all intents and pur-
poses the deal has made Iran a nuclear power be-
cause it can now have a nuclear programme and con-
duct research unhindered. Its nuclear programme 
will get a huge boost because Iran will no longer suf-
fer from sanctions and be able to invest more in it. 
For that reason, the Israeli prime minister considers 
the nuclear agreement to be a “mistake of historical 
dimensions” (See: <www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/
iran-benjamin-netanyhahu-poltert-gegen-atom-deal-
a-1042569.html> [accessed 14 July 2015]).
Only the future will show whether the nucle-
ar agreement was a mistake, a success, or an op-
portunity.
4 The Guardian, 25 September 2013.
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